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The Marine Corps Reserve has the depot maintenance
portion of the 0&M,MCR appropriation derived by inflating
last years budget figure. The appropriation is then billed
for depot maintenance on a "fair share" basis, with no
system to identify whether the costs of work performed by
the depot maintenance activities were actually incurred in
work performed on Marine Corps Reserve equipment. The focus
of this thesis is the breakdown in the current process of
linking costs charged to the Reserve appropriation to actual
Reserve generated depot maintenance requirements. Two
alternative proposals are presented that allow for a link
between actual measures of depot maintenance attributable to
the Reserves, and the planning, programming, budgeting, and
execution processes. The study recommends a change from the
current methods of managing depot maintenance for the
Reserves to an alternative method which measures Reserve
depot maintenance in terms of equipment issued to Reserve
units from the supply system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM
The Reserve division at Headquarters Marine Corps has
the depot maintenance portion of the Operations and
Maintenance appropriation derived from a historical figure
plus an inflation factor. The appropriation is, subseq-
uently (and somewhat arbitrarily), billed for depot mainte-
nance performed against this amount on a "fair share" basis.
There is currently no policy or system to identify costs of
work performed at the depot maintenance activities with
Marine Corps Reserve equipment. This causes an account-
ability problem in terms of reconciling what is budgeted
with actual charges being funded against the appropriate
account. The primary consideration here is whether or not
it is feasible for the Reserves, while working under the
auspices of a "one Marine Corps" system, to be able to
determine their actual share of depot maintenance related
funding.
B. THE NEED FOR THE STUDY
For the last few years there has been growing concern
whether what is being budgeted for the Reserves for depot
maintenance is actually being spent in support of the
Reserves. The inability of the current system to supply
justifiable answers to this concern not only opens the
system to criticism but also puts the Marine Corps in the
precarious position of being required by Congress to carry
out a program, yet not being able to do it in a justifiable
manner.
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The area of this research is the portion of the
Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve appropria-
tion related to depot maintenance. Specifically, the objec-
tive was to study the feasibility of identifying Marine
Corps Reserve depot maintenance costs for use in the devel-
opment of the POM and the budget. The study will be
strictly limited to the Operations and Maintenance, Marine
Corps and the Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps
Reserve appropriations. It will include an analysis of the
activity of the organizations of the Inventory Control Point
at the Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia; the
office of maintenance management at Installations and
Logistics, Headquarters Marine Corps (further referred to as
LMM-3); and the Repair Division of the Marine Corps
Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia (further referred to as the
DMA).
D. RESEARCH METHODS
The bulk of the research for this study involved
performing on-site interviews with key personnel from the
agencies mentioned in the previous section. Additionally,
technical information about the planning, programming, budg-
eting, and execution phases within the Marine Corps was
extracted from the Navy Comptroller's Manual, Volumes II and
VII. Background on Management principles in nonprofit
organizations was derived from the Robert N. Anthony and
Regina E. Herzlinger book. Management Control in Non-profit
Organizations . Other information specific to certain areas
of the study was obtained from Marine Corps Orders, local
standing operating procedures, and follow-up telephone calls
to the persons interviewed.
The intent was to establish a set of principles that
allows for sound management of the depot maintenance
process. Then, the current practices were compared with
these developed principles in order to determine whether or
not they were in compliance. Finally, two alternatives were
developed to enhance compliance with the principles of a
good management process; and benefits and costs were
assessed for each alternative.
E. EVALUATION CRITERIA
The evaluation of the proposed alternatives was viewed
in terms of rejevant costs to perform the functions neces-
sary to change from the current system of managing depot
maintenance for the Reserves relative to the benefits of
each of the alternatives. No benefits in terms of force
readiness could be found. The benefits central to the final
recommendation, then, are the degree of precision needed to
measure Reserve related depot maintenance requirements and
the degree of flexibility needed to ensure that essential
maintenance work will be accomplished. The final considera-
tion between precision and flexibility centers around the
characteristic of credibility- -the value of having Fiscal
Division, HQMC and, ultimately. Congress believe that the




The thesis begins with a general background to introduce
the various organizations involved in the depot maintenance
process and their interactions within the scope of the
supply system. It then develops a model of what a good
management control process should be like. This model is,
subsequently, used as a standard to compare the current
process and proposed processes in order to provide the basis
for determining the merits of each. In describing each
process, costs and benefits are derived and the conclusions





The Marine Corps Supply System, which by authorization
of the Secretary of the Navy is separate and distinct from
the Navy Supply System, is controlled by the Commandant of
the Marine Corps. The mission of the Marine Corps Supply
System is to provide and manage those items necessary for
equipping, maintaining, and operating Fleet Marine Forces,
supporting establishments, and the Marine Corps Reserve.
This supply system makes the Marine Corps essentially self-
sustaining in logistics operations and is structured to the
needs of the worldwide operating and supporting forces. It
is characterized by centralized management and stock
control, decentralized distribution points, and maximum use
of automatic data processing.
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and
Logistics (I&L) , the principal logistician on the general
staff of the Commandant, is responsible for logistics plans
and policies, material program objectives, and programs
relating to material readiness. Within I&L, HQMC, code
LMM-3 (further referred to as LMM-3) are the functional
managers for all aspects of depot level maintenance for
assets managed under the Marine Corps Unified Material
Management System. This concept has consolidated all
management functions normally associated with military
supply into a single integrated system. The organizational
structure to satisfy the Marine Corps Unified Management
System consists of Marine Corps Headquarters, one inventory
control point which is part of the Marine Corps Logistics
Base, located at Albany, Georgia, and two distribution
centers (see Figure 2.1). The two distribution centers are
at the Albany Marine Corps Logistics Base, Georgia and the
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, California. The
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Marine Corps Logistics Base at Albany provides logistic
support for Fleet Marine Forces (including Reserve) in the
eastern United States and the Atlantic theater. The Marine
Corps Logistics Base at Barstow provides logistics support
for Fleet Marine Force units (including Reserve) in the
western United States and the Pacific theater. [Ref . 1]
COMMANDANT OF THE
MARINE CORPS





MARINE CORPS LOGISTIC MARINE CORPS LOGISTIC
BASE, ALBANY, GEORGIA BASE, BARSTOW, CALIFORNIA
(Inventory Control Point)
Figure 2.1 Marine Corps Unified Management System.
B. DEPOT MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY
1. Mission
There are two Depot Maintenance Activities (DMA's)
in the Marine Corps. They are organizationally designated
as the Repair Divisions of the Marine Corps Logistic Bases
(MCLB's) Albany, Georgia, and Barstow, California, as
depicted in Figure 2.2 [Ref. 2]. However, the DMA's are
industrially funded activities and, as such, operate as
tenant activities at the two MCLB's. Their relationship is
one of customer (MCLB) and service center (DMA).
The mission of the DMA's is to repair, rebuild, and
modify all types of Marine Corps ground combat and combat






























•' The Weapons System/Equipment Maintenance Directorate
(WESM) and the Inventory Control Point (ICP) are two
different names for the same organization
"" The Depot Maintenance Activity
Figure 2.2 The MCLB , Albany.
Marine Corps Reserves, and Posts and Stations. It also
includes the care and maintenance of equipment and supplies
held in storage at the supply center for later issue to
these same forces. Other work associated with the DMA's
mission includes preservation, testing, technical evaluation
and design, development, and fabrication of equipment for
special projects.
2 . Organization
For the purpose of clarity, further references to
the organization and functions of a depot maintenance
activity will be based on the depot maintenance activity at
the MCLB Albany, Georgia. This focus permits a detailed
description of the DMA's organization and operations. It
does not impair the generality of the discussion, however.
The DMA at Barstow is not different from the one at Albany
in any material way that is pertinent to this thesis.
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In order to accomplish the variety of work inherent
in it's mission, the DMA is organized into six major




Metrology Industrial Shops Quality Production
Branch Engineering Branch Control Control
Branch Branch Branch
Vehicle Ordnance Comm/Elect Support Preservation
"PCC PCC PCC PCC PCC
« PCC- -Production Control Center
Figure 2.3 Repair Division.
The Metrology and Shops branches are the two opera-
tional components, while the other branches provide
supporting administrative and control (G&A) services. The
task oriented production control centers of the Shops Branch
carry out the majority of the DMA's work and are further
organized into subunits called cost work centers (CWC's).
It is these CWC's that actually contain the personnel who
perform the maintenance functions. The CWC's are organized
on the shop floor in a job-shop configuration. The opera-
tions are performed in the CWC and the equipment is then
moved to the next CWC in the rebuild/repair/ modification
sequence. Each end item is tagged with an assigned job
order number in order that work can be charged to the appro-
priate job. (In the case of disassembly, each component is
additionally tagged. ) Charges are then assessed against the
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appropriate job order number (JON- -initiated by the DMA) by
the individual employees manually entering labor hours and
material usage into the DMA's central computer at any one of
29 terminals located throughout the shop floor. The key
here is that it is the CWC ' s through which the basic data
are captured to show job performance, time, and costs of
operations
.
The magnitude of work tracked through the DMA's
CWC's is such that for Fiscal Year 1985 the master work
schedule for the DMA at Albany projects a program cost of
over $35,000,000 and will require nearly 930,000 manhours of
direct civilian and military labor. These resources will be
used in rebuild efforts for over 400 major line items and
project orders totaling some 25,000 individual items of
equipment. To handle this workload, the DMA had an author-
ized strength as of 1 October 1984 of seven Marine Corps
Officers, 193 Marine enlisted men, 145 graded civilians, and
549 ungraded civilians, for a total authorized strength of
849. [Ref. 3]
3 . Interrelationship with other Agencies
For Fiscal Year 1985, the DMA's workload broke down
in such a way that 68% of it went toward the 5th echelon
(depot level) rebuild program for active FMF and reserve
equipment. The rest of it's workload was attributable to
the overflow of work from lower echelons of maintenance (3rd
and 4th) in the active FMF and Reserves (3%), technical
assistance (1%), special projects and new developments
(16%), support to other armed services and nations (1%), and
care-in-storage (11%) [Ref. 2]
.
The organization that manages the rebuild and repair
of FMF equipment (the majority of the DMA's workload) for
the Marine Corps Supply System is the Inventory Control
Point (ICP). The ICP is located at the Marine Corps
Logistic Base, Albany. It manages the rebuild and repair of
equipment within the context of the Replacement and
15
Evacuation (R&E) Program which allows both active FMF and
Reserve units to replace nominated items of equipment in a
direct exchange with the supply stores of equipment at the
Marine Corps Logistic Bases. The equipment received from
the active FMF and Reserve units will then be rebuilt and/ or
repaired to a serviceable status. In all of this, the ICP
must ensure that the stores system maintains an adequate
inventory of serviceable assets. In addition to maintaining
a pool of serviceable assets to support the R&E Program, the
stores system must hold and maintain sufficient serviceable
end items to support the mobilization requirements imposed
by the Maritime Prepositioning Ships program (MPS 1,2,&3),
the Prepositioned War Reserve safety levels, and the initial
issue of equipment which is identified in active FMF and
Reserve unit's tables of equipment but has not yet been
released by the MCLB to these units. Because these are
total Marine Corps requirements to support various mobiliza-
tions with varying priorities as to who would get what
equipment first, the ICP has not been concerned with
tracking the identity of the equipment once it is received
into the supply stores system. However, this loss of iden-
tity is a major dilemma when it comes to determining the
cost to support the Reserves portion of depot maintenance to
be performed later at the DMA.
The ICP is able to determine what equipment should
be turned in to the stores system for the R&E Program. So,
with this and an estimate of repair work on component parts,
it provides the quantitative rebuild and repair requirements
to Headquarters Marine Corps, code LMM-3, which prepares it
for inclusion in the Marine Corps Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) for submission to DOD and, eventually.
Congress. It is during this POM process that the informa-
tion provided by the ICP to LMM-3 is converted into a
Master Work Program which lays out the DMA's workload for
the POM year plus the next four years. Ultimately, this
16
Master Work Program is revised for the budget year and
becomes the Master Work Schedule for the DMA for the next
fiscal year. Thus, it is the ICP which plays the major role
in determining what the DMA's workload will be.
This interaction in the POM process between the ICP
and LMM-3 (in addition to the development of the Master Work
Program and Master Work Schedule) is key to the development
of the depot maintenance portions of the Operations and
Maintenance, Marine Corps and Operations and Maintenance,
Marine Corps Reserve appropriations. Subsequently, this
same interaction is the major determinant of the DMA's
projected workload in terms of upcoming requirements for
materials and manhours . This directly influences the DMA's
Marine Corps Industrial Fund (MCIF) budget. [Ref. 4]
The O&M appropriations are managed by LMM-3. It
programs for, budgets for, and has total obligational
authority for depot maintenance for the Marine Corps (both
Active and Reserve). LMM-3 's role as intercessor between
the ICP and the DMA is mandated by Congress with the intent
of allowing the DMA to operate independently from the MCLB
(and the supply system) , while being located at the same
base and sharing common support functions.
Of importance in the interrelationships among the
DMA, the ICP, and LMM-3 at HQMC is the realization that the
depot maintenance portion of the O&M Appropriation exists as
a means to reimburse work done at the DMA. Additionally,
the information that these organizations provide for the
purpose of O&M funding is a major determinant of the
approved level of industrial funding that the DMA receives.
4. The Marine Corps Industrial Fund
The MCIF provides the revolving or working capital
which finances the industrial operations of the DMA on a
reimbursable basis. That is, work is authorized by orders
citing customers' appropriations that are to be charged for
the work. Costs to fulfill these orders are then,
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initially, financed by the DMA's own working capital and
are, subsequently, billed to these customers' appropria-
tions. Thus, the DMA is reimbursed for it's services. This
process of using working capital (cash) to provide the
material, labor, and overhead necessary to process end items
and secondary repairables (creating a work-in-process) and
then using billings to convert the work-in-process back to
cash is a continuous one (as illustrated in Figure 2.4).
This allows for a fixed corpus of working capital to finance
an even larger amount of work because of the continual flow










Figure 2.4 MCIF (a revolving fund).
The Marine Corps Industrial Fund budget for the DMA
is prepared annually. It is based on the requirements
developed in the POM process relative to the estimated
levels of depot maintenance scheduled for the DMA. It is
then translated by the DMA itself into planned staffing
patterns for each G&A and Production Control Center for
determination of the MCIF Budget and, as such, is separate
from but related to the depot maintenance portion of the O&M
Appropriations. For instance, because the DMA executes
18
customer programs which are financed with appropriated
funds, reductions in the factors determining the the amounts
programmed for depot level maintenance in the O&M appropria-
tions budgets will result in like reductions in the MCIF
Budget. The MCIF Budget, then, reflects anticipated
spending of appropriated funds and contributes to the
support of appropriation budgets.
The initial corpus of the MCIF is allocated from the
Office of the Comptroller of the Navy to the Commandant of
the Marine Corps. The Commandant will then, in turn, allo-
cate working capital to the head of each industrially funded
activity (the Commanding Generals, MCLB ' s Albany and
Barstow) vesting in them obligational authority to perform
depot level maintenance at the DMA. Occasionally, the
corpus is augmented by a direct injection of funds from
Congressional appropriations in order to compensate for
inflationary factors such as pay increases, to expand the
fund in response to an increase in the work load require-
ments at the DMA, or to reflect a status change in the
Prepositioned War Reserve. However, the majority of annual
funds flow into the MCIF from it's customers. It's largest
customer is the Marine Corps Supply system for the rebuild
and repair of principal end items of equipment, which work
is funded by the portion of the O&M appropriation dealing
with depot maintenance. [Ref. 5]
C. APPROPRIATION AND PROGRAM FORMATS
1 . General
The Marine Corps budget for depot maintenance is
presented in terms of two purposes. It is presented in the
appropriation format in terms of resources needed to finance
the programs set forth (i.e., inputs or costs). It is also
presented in the program format in terms of resource
requirements needed to accomplish the projected level of
activity inherent in meeting organizational goals (i.e.,
outputs). When the budget is executed, the actual inputs
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(costs) can be compared with the actual outputs (the activi-
ties actually accomplished) to be used in measuring organi-
zational efficiency. Additionally, the actual outputs can
be compared to programmed activity levels for use in
analyzing organizational effectiveness.
The appropriation format provides both the framework
for formulating budget requirements and the legal source
from which to execute and subsequently account for author-
ized programs. Within the arena of DOD budgeting, appropri-
ations can be categorized as either Operations and
Maintenance, Military Pay, Research, Procurement, or
Construction. They can also be divided into smaller
accounts according to purpose or budget activities. The
budget activities serve to clarify the function of the
budget and provide the link to various programs encompassed
in each major category. Appropriations make available funds
which are authorized by the Congress to be used for special
purposes and cannot be expended for other than the purpose
stipulated. [Ref. 6]
The program format sets forth what accomplishments
can be expected from resources made available over a span of
the next five years. This Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP)
currently encompasses ten programs which identify broad
areas of both mission and support as depicted in Table I .
The building block of the program format is the
program element (PE) which is a grouping of forces,
manpower, and costs associated with an organization, a group
of similar organizations, a function, or a project. PE's
can be aggregated within each program [Ref. 7].
2. The 0&M ,MC Appropriation
The Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps
Appropriation is structured by budget activities which
directly reflect four of the ten FYDP programs depicted in
Table I . They are- -Budget Activity II, General Purpose
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Research and Development
Central Supply and Maintenance




Support of Other Nations
Budget Activity VIII, Training, Medical, and Other General
Personnel; and Budget Activity IX, Administration and
Associated Activities. Each budget activity will be divided
into program packages which are aggregations from one or
more of the 10 FYDP programs.
Of the four budget activities mentioned above,
Budget Activity VII, Central Supply and Maintenance is
germane to this study because within it exists the program
package related to depot maintenance- -Program Package,
Equipment Maintenance.
Table II shows data extracted from the Department of
the Navy Justification of Estimates for Fiscal Year 1986
submitted to Congress in February 1985 for Operations and
Maintenance, Marine Corps [Ref. 8]. It provides not only
the structure of the 0&M,MC appropriation for Budget
Activity VII but also a perspective on the size of the
0&M,MC appropriation that is specified for depot maintenance
under Program Package, Equipment Maintenance.
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TABLE II
0&M,MC- -BUDGET ACTIVITY VII ($000)
Program Packages
:




Supply Depot $43,749 $44,219 $51,192
Operations
Inventory Control 50,542 73,112 36,659
Point
Transportation of 55,653 103,453 99,920
Things
Other Logistic 20,392 24,785 22,632
Support
Commissary Stores 16,501 17,100 16,821
Operations
Equipment Maintenance 93,536 121,778 127,444
Stock and Industrial
Fund Support 27,356
Base Operations 50,986 54,434 57,604




The Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve
Appropriation (0&M,MCR) is structured into three budget
activities, and each is a program package unto itself.
These packages are made up of program elements or aggrega-
tions of program elements within the Five Year Defense
Program- -Program V, Guard and Reserve Forces. Table III
shows the structure and relative size of the 0&M,MCR appro-
priation as provided in the Department of the Navy
Justification of Estimates for Fiscal Year 1986 submitted to
Congress in February 1985 for Operations and Maintenance,
Marine Crops Reserve [Ref. 8]. Specifically germane to this
study is Budget Activity 2, Depot Maintenance.
22
TABLE III
0&M,MCR--BY BUDGET ACTIVITY ($000)




BUDGET ACTIVITY 1 $24,640 $29,325 $30,307
BUDGET ACTIVITY 2 1,587 1,665 1,692
BUDGET ACTIVITY 3 25,884 27,852 29,601
4. The Significance of Separate Appropriations
The Navy Comptroller's Manual [Ref. 6] states that
the 0&M,MC appropriation. Budget Activity VII- -Program
Package, Equipment Maintenance funds the depot maintenance
(major repair and rebuild) of Marine Corps ground equipment
( less Marine Corps Reserve equipment ) . The depot mainte-
nance for the Reserves is to be programmed, budgeted, and
accounted for separately within the 0&M,MCR appropriation.
Budget Activity 2.
This separation of Reserve accounts from active duty
accounts is a result of a special DOD Appropriation Act
passed by Congress in 1973. It requires all services to
create separate O&M accounts for their Reserve Forces. This
requirement derived from Congressional concern as to why
active duty forces were seen to be modernizing while Reserve
Forces were being structured with older "hand-me-down"
equipment, much of which was in disrepair [Ref. 9]. Thus,
by law, the Marine Corps must match costs to perform depot
level maintenance with the correct source (active or reserve
unit) in order to account properly for work charged to each
one's own program package for depot maintenance. However,
under current practices there is no way to match costs of
performing maintenance to either Active or Reserve units.
Current practices have the DMA accepting and
performing work in support of the supply system, and, as
mentioned earlier, the supply system (specifically the ICP
23
inventory managers) does not record the identity of
equipment received into the equipment stores system.
Because of this, the requirements that LMM-3 receives from
the ICP to fund work at the DMA contain no reference as to
what portion of the work is attributable to Reserve equip-
ment. Therefore, what the DMA actually receives is a
"batch" of equipment to be rebuilt and/or repaired for one
customer (the supply system). Even though the DMA has the
ability to capture direct costs associated with the work
they perform, the work will be charged to one appropriation
(either the 0&M,MC appropriation or the 0&M,MCR appropria-
tion) but never a combination of the two because there is no
methodology for distinguishing how to allocate costs between
Active and Reserve equipment.
The result is a completely arbitrary system of sepa-
rating Reserve appropriations from Active Marine Corps
appropriations relative to depot level maintenance, with no
direct link to actual costs to rebuild, repair, and/or
modify each one's equipment.
D. THE PRINCIPLES OF A GOOD MANAGEMENT PROCESS
1. General
This section addresses the process by which manage-
ment can plan organize, direct, and control the funding and
execution of depot level maintenance efforts within an
organization. Subsequent chapters analyze the current prac-
tices of LMM-3, the ICP, and the DMA in the management of
the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of depot





The principal steps in a formally controlled system
are 1) some degree of high level planning
, 2) programming,
which translates plans into time-phased activities, 3) budg-
eting, which further projects these programs in terms of
realistic requirements for a specific year (subject to total
24
resource constraints), and 4) operating, measuring and
reporting performance of the plan. Each of these steps
should lead to the next, recur in a regular cycle, and
together constitute a "closed loop" system. The information
in the system consists of estimated or actual data relative
to measurements of outputs (e.g., force readiness levels,
unit training accomplishments , or, in terms of depot mainte-
nance, quantities of equipment rebuilt, repaired, and/or
modified) and inputs (usually expressed as costs). Prior to
actual operations, decisions and estimates are made as to
what outputs and inputs are to be; during actual operations,
records are maintained as to what outputs and inputs actu-
ally are; and subsequent to operations, reports are prepared
that compare actual outputs and inputs to estimated outputs
and inputs, and action is taken on the basis of these
reports. [Ref. 10:p. 14]
3 . Planning
Planning is defined as the process of deciding on
the goals of the organization and on the broad strategies
that are to be used in attaining these goals [Ref. 10:p. 2].
Strategy defines the direction of an organization. It iden-
tifies overall goals and often influences objective priori-
ties. However, strategy will almost always acknowledge the
realities of broad constraints in an endeavor to subscribe
to attainable goals. In other words, get the most in the
way of resources and do as much as possible with them.
However, where the available resources cannot produce the
desired outcomes, the definition of goals becomes much more
complicated. This forces prioritization and a degree of
compromise between the choice of goals and the resources
available. To this extent, what is called the plan and what
is called the program is sometimes hard to separate.
Conceptually, planning encompasses setting goals and strat-
egies for achieving these goals, while programming takes
these goals and strategies as given and seeks to identify
25
functions, projects, or activities that will implement them.
In practice, however, there will be considerable overlap in
that the programming process may identify the desirability
of changing goals or strategies, while planning might
include some consideration of the programs that will be
adopted to achieve goals.
An important reason for making a separation in prac-
tice between programming and planning is that the program-
ming process tends to become institutionalized and thus
tends to put a damper on creative activities. A separate
planning activity can provide an offset to this tendency.
Planning should be the beginning of a process which starts
off relatively pure at the highest levels and, as it filters
down the organization, will become more and more constrained
by the realities of scarce resources so that it will eventu-
ally take on the form of guidance for the development of
specific activities or functions [Ref. 10:p. 278].
4 . Programming
The programming phase of a control process is not a
distinctly separate endeavor. Instead, it follows from the
planning phase and involves making decisions about the
specific means of achieving the goals and strategies previ-
ously set forth. These goals and strategies should be
translated into specific programs according to functions,
organizations, projects, or similar groupings consistent
with the ways in which the resources will be used. This
sets a structure of programs capable of aggregating data in
such a way that will be useful to different levels of
managers (top level, program manager level, and operational
manager level). Ideally, then, these program structures
will be time-phased in terms of projected outputs (e.g.
accomplishments, postures, or states of readiness). This is
presented in terms of the full costs of carrying out
programs in future years. The end result is a statement, in
financial terms, of the organization's capability to meet
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its plans and goals. It is presented in programs capable of
aggregating data in a way which facilitates future decisions
and comparisons by managers relative to resources allocated
to programs and fees charged to customers for the reimburse-
ment of costs incurred in executing the programs. [Ref. 10:
p. 7]
5 . Budgeting
While planning and programming tend to emanate
primarily from the top of the organization down and feature
full costs of carrying out programs into future years , budg-
eting is tied to the operating levels (responsibility
centers) that are responsible for controlling and measuring
the inputs of labor, materials, and services necessary to
carry out the proposed programs during the next year, A
budget is a financial plan which states realistic figures
relative to the next year's resources required to meet
organizational objectives as laid out in the planning and
programming phases. Additionally, budgeting provides a tool
to monitor the organization's financial activity during this
same time frame [Ref. 10:p. 79]. To do this, it must be
able to relate budget activities to programs. The common
link between the two must be the basic building blocks which
state what resources were used, for what purposes, for whom,
and by whom. These building blocks (the program elements)
must be capable of being aggregated for measuring program
effectiveness, as well as operational efficiency.
As with programming, the budget process incorporates
two-way communications. Guidance flows through the organi-
zation from planners, and operating managers should in turn
formulate their budgets consistent with these guidelines. In
concert with this, however, operating managers should be
free to negotiate trade-offs among proposed programs so as
to implement those programs (old or new) that are most
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beneficial to the organization's ultimate goals. This
two-way process helps to ensure that all levels of the
organization are committed to accomplishing the planned
program.
6. Operating , Measuring , and Reporting
During the period of actual operations, records need
to be kept of resources actually consumed and outputs actu-
ally achieved. The records of resources consumed (i.e.,
costs) are structured so that costs are collected both by
program and by responsibility centers. As mentioned
earlier, planners and programmers are concerned with a
system of capturing costs relative to programs (i.e., func-
tions, organizations, and projects). Operating managers in
responsibility centers need a system of data collection for
use in planning, coordinating, and controlling the activi-
ties of their respective responsibility centers. Costs
captured under the program structure are subsequently used
as a basis for future programming, while costs captured
under the responsibility center structure are used to
measure the performance of the responsibility centers and
their managers
.
In order to have an articulated system, the program
cost accounts should be related to the responsibility center
cost accounts. Because the program structure lays out
projected resources for specific programs relative to func-
tions, organizations, or projects, the responsibility center
account structure should likewise identify 1) who is using
the resources and for what purposes, 2) whether or not the
funds are being used in the manner in which they were budg-
eted, 3) what functions were being performed when the
resources were used
,
and 4) what kind of resources were
used [Ref . 11]
.
Reporting and analysis completes the process and
closes the loop on the control system by bringing back to
those responsible managers information which can be used to
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compare actual performance with planned performance. These
reports should be used by managers to stay abreast of
current activities. Additionally, they should be used to
evaluate operations of the activity as well as the activity
managers. Finally, the reports can be used as a tool for
program evaluation and may lead to program revisions if
optimal results are not being achieved otherwise.
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III. THE DEPOT MAINTENANCE PROCESS
A. PLANNING
In the preceding chapter, it was established that plan-
ning is a process of deciding on organizational goals and
the broad strategies to be used in attaining these goals.
Strategies related to force modernization, readiness, and
mobilization affect depot maintenance in terms of increased
costs to repair, rebuild, and/or modify new equipment; in
terms of increased maintenance costs resulting from greater
amounts of equipment introduced into the system; and in
terms of increased demand to provide for more equipment to
be serviceable at one time.
There are three strategic programs that impact on depot
maintenance: 1) the Near Time Prepositioning Force (NTPF)
Program, 2) the Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) Program,
and 3) the War Reserve Program. The War Reserve Program
ensures that an acceptable level of material and equipment
is available to the Fleet Marine Forces and Reserves during
both mobilization and combat operations. The asset posture
needed to support this program is identified by CMC in it's
Initial Guidance and Programming Plan and includes not only
unit tables of equipment levels, but also supply stores
stock levels adequate to assure timely support of specific
forces until replenishment can be effected [Ref. 12]. The
NTPF Program is an interim program directed at the attain-
ment of maritime prepositioning for possible contingency
use. The majority of equipment for the NTPF Program was
acquired from Prepositioned War Reserve Materials Stocks of
the War Reserve Program. The draw down was significant,
putting a strain on the Supply Stores System in terms of
available assets to support on-going maintenance programs.
Currently, the Marine Corps is replacing it's NTPF require-
ments by realigning assets to support the MPS Program. The
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MPS Program will deploy equipment to support three separate
brigades on ships (MPS-1, MPS-2, and MPS-3). This program
surpasses the NTPF Program because the ships can be moved to
potential trouble spots and offloaded to provide greater
readiness and mobilization. Also, the MPS Program is
different from the NTPF Program in that the equipment to
support the MPS Program is to be purchased through acquisi-
tion programs and not drawn from present organizational
assets [Ref . 16]
.
In any case, these strategic programs will affect the
total types of, amounts of, and priorities of repair for
equipment needed in the Marine Corps inventory. These
needs, in turn, influence major procurement programs and/or
modification programs, both of which have an impact on
future requirements for depot maintenance. Additionally,
policies addressing force readiness in terms of unit
training will have a direct effect on depot maintenance
requirements. That is, as unit training levels increase, so
too will the amount of equipment usage and , likewise, main-
tenance requirements.
B. PROGRAMMING
In support of strategies such as force modernization,
readiness, and mobilization, which require an influx of
equipment into the supply system, programmers must analyze
certain factors to determine whether to purchase new equip-
ment or rebuild, repair, and/or modify existing equipment.
In this regard, inventory managers at the ICP derive infor-
mation that reflects whether assets will be available to
service the projected requirements (i.e.. Replacement and
Evacuation- -R&E program, War Reserve Program, and supply
stores stock- -equipment ready for issue). When it is found
that requirements exceed assets, a potential buy situation
exists. The decision to buy new or to upgrade old equipment
will be based on an analysis of the expected useful life of
the equipment, the mean time between major rebuild
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requirements, and the effects of increased technology on
maintenance costs over the life of the equipment. The
result of these efforts is complimentary acquisition and
modification programs developed by acquisition project offi-
cers (APO's) to meet strategic requirements.
LMM-3 (which is responsible for aggregating data into
the program format, for preparing the budget, and for obli-
gating funds for depot level maintenance) will be the recip-
ient of the efforts of the ICP and the APOs . LMM-3 will
derive the depot maintenance portions of the FYDP programs 5
and 7- -Guard and Reserve Forces and Central Supply and
Maintenance. Each of these programs will consist of program
elements expressed as line items for equipment maintenance.
The program elements are principal end items (PEI's), secon-
dary repairables (SDK's), and modifications (MOD's). The
program element for PEI's reflects the cost to perform depot
level rebuild and repair work on principal end items of
Marine Corps equipment (trucks, tanks, howitzers, etc.).
The data for this are derived from a projected turn- in
schedule based on usage (usually time or miles). The
program element for SDR's reflects the cost to perform depot
level rebuild and repair of components of end items
(engines, transmissions, etc.). These data are derived from
historical data to project repair cycles. The data for the
program element MOD's will be derived by the APO's and
provided to LMM-3 as a dollar figure to be included in the
POM submission. The data reflect the direct costs for work
to be performed by the DMA for the proposed modification
programs [Ref. 4].
Both the PEI's and SDR's will be derived at the ICP as
part of the Marine Corps Depot Level Maintenance Program
(DLMP). The DLMP is developed as a method of determining
quantitative rebuild and repair requirements from which data
will be developed for inclusion in the POM for submission to
DOD and Congress [Ref. 13].
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1. The ICP, Depot Level Maintenance Program
a. Principal End Items *
One aspect of the DLMP will be to forecast the
amounts of PEI ' s that will meet the requirements (miles,
hours, or years of usage) for depot level rebuild for the
next five years for the entire Marine Corps. In addition to
projecting the amounts, the DLMP will assign a point value
indicating each item's rebuild priority. This is based on
the type of unit (Active, Reserve, Cadre, I&I) and mobiliza-
tion factors. The methodology involves comparing service-
able and then the unserviceable assets (for Active and
Reserve separately) projected to be available with the table
of equipment (TE) and table of equipment for training (TA)
for the Active and Reserves, respectively. This identifies
unserviceable items on-hand at the beginning of the fiscal
year and unserviceable items that will be generated during
the year. The two figures are summed and the process
repeated to project the total rebuild and repair require-
ments for the next five years [Ref. 13]. These projections
are tied very closely to the R&E program because the repair
program for PEI ' s is the primary source of serviceable
equipment for the the supply stores stock (equipment ready
for issue), which is the pool of assets used to support the
R&E program. Of significance in this process is that
Reserve assets and requirements will be computed separately
by identifying Reserve command designators.
b. Secondary Repairables
The secondary repairable (SDR) DLMP requirements
will lead to the projected amounts of component items
(engines, transmissions, etc.) requiring depot level repair
at the DMA for the next five years. The methodology is much
the same as that for deriving PEI requirements. The data
are obtained from the DMA and/or commercial activities in
terms of repair cycle requirements, repair cycle times,
projected shortages, and back orders to determine SDR
33
requirements. The data are compared with projections of
unserviceable assets in order to* develop a repair schedule
for the outyears . Of significance here is the fact that the
data for SDR requirements lack any identity to either Active
or Reserve unit's equipment- -it is total force repair
requirements. Therefore, in order to determine separate
Reserve SDR requirements, the ICP (via the Comptroller)
tracks what has been sent to Reserve units and derives an
average annual dollar amount to project for Reserve SDR
repairs. Where data for a specific item are not available,
the ICP merely estimates the cost to repair an item as
approximately equal to 60% of it's purchase price. [Ref. 4]
2. LMM-3 , POM Input
As functional manager for depot equipment mainte-
nance, LMM-3 is responsible for preparing the data received
from the ICP regarding PEI ' s and SDR's and from the acquisi-
tion project officers regarding modification for submission
into the Marine Corps POM.
The data that the ICP provides in the DLMP for PEI '
s
are stated is terms of number and type of end items. LMM-3
will review this to ensure that the items projected are
valid- -that is, that they are in the inventory. New items
need to be phased in and old items need to be phased out
accurately in the outyears. Also, LMM-3 will check to
ensure that items do not appear as PEI ' s when they should be
repaired as SDR's. LMM-3 will, additionally, check the
priorities associated with the PEI ' s to ensure conformation
with CMC guidance. LMM-3, after validating the require-
ments, will price them by using last year's actual mainte-
nance costs as the base. In concert with applying these
base costs to repair the PEIs , LMM-3 also applies escalation
factors to adjust the resultant program costs. These esca-
lation factors are provided by CMC and include not only cost
growth associated with inflation but also real cost growth,
which is growth caused by supply and demand; by changes in
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design, quantity and schedule; and by estimating and factor
changes [Ref. 14],
The SDR data come to LMM-3 as a dollar figure from
the ICP. The ICP has been delegated (by LMM-3) the total
responsibility to manage all aspects of SDR's.
Consequently, LMM-3 merely incorporates the SDR data into
the POM format with no detailed review.
The last program element incorporated into the total
depot maintenance program is for modifications. MOD data
identify funds that are required to install depot level
modification kits that either have been purchased or are
currently authorized (or budgeted) to be purchased with
Marine Corps procurement funds. The data for modification
are derived from the core of the Procurement Marine Corps
(PMC) appropriation or from initiatives generated by acqui-
sition project officers. Since the total funding require-
ment for modifications is tied to the PMC appropriation and
APO initiatives, it reflects a total force requirement.
LMM-3 has no way currently of separating what would be the
Reserves share form the Active duty share. Therefore, the
modification program element amount is included solely in
the depot maintenance portion of the 0&M,MC appropriation.
The result of LMM-3 *s efforts at this stage of the
programming process is an accumulation of costs for the POM
year plus the next four years broken down into PEI , SDR, and
modification program elements. The PEI ' s and SDR's are
designated between Active and Reserve and can thus be incor-
porated into the appropriate program format. The modifica-
tion data are all compiled into the 0&M,MC program.
However, LMM-3 applies a last analysis to the Reserve
figures and adjusts them to conform to a traditional pattern
by shuffling the projected quantities listed in the DLMP
between Active and Reserve to "fit" a historically budgeted
trend. This amount is projected as a level amount for the
outyears , to be adjusted in each subsequent year. This
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process makes the final amount programmed for the O&M5MCR
appropriation (program package 2- -depot maintenance) an
arbitrary figure. LMM-3 merely uses the input from the TCP
as a "barometer" of the projected amounts for Reserve depot
maintenance. This process is currently used because of the
nature of the supply system--that is, the "one Marine Corps"
concept. Depot level maintenance of equipment is performed
in support of the supply system and not individual units
and, as a result, there is no operational need to consider
equipment unit identification as being germane once an item
enters the supply system. Also, because LMM-3 and the ICP
have, together, obligational authority for all depot mainte-
nance (LMM-3 for Mod's and PEI ' s and the ICP for SDK's),
both will ensure that all depot maintenance is accomplished
regardless of whether it is charged to the 0&M,MC or the
0&M,MCR appropriation [Ref. 14].
3. LMM-3
,
The Master Work Plan
In addition to using the 5 year DLMP as the source
of data for the development of the depot maintenance portion
of the POM, LMM-3 also converts it into a 5-year work
schedule--a master work plan. The master work plan will
plan the workload assigned to each DMA, to other services,
and to commercial activities for the POM year plus the next
four years. The master work plan will be sent to each of
the activities listed above, as well as to the ICP. This
allows all activities concerned to project long range
requirements and provides a base for future programming and
budgeting. The master work plan has no reference to whether
the equipment scheduled for maintenance is attributable to
Active or Reserve units. It merely identifies a type and
quantity of equipment on a specific line number, which iden-
tifies a programmed level of output and will later be used
to schedule and fund depot maintenance.
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C . BUDGETING
The budgeting for the depot maintenance portions of the
0&M,MC and 0&M,MCR appropriations is done by LMM-3. The
budget for depot maintenance is an outgrowth of the master
work plan. The master work plan, at this point of the
process, will have been revised and reformatted several
times--each time bringing the projected schedule more into
line with current expectations and circumstances. Three
months prior to the beginning of the next fiscal year, the
current year of the master work plan will be reviewed,
converted, and republished as the master work schedule. The
result is that the master work schedule identifies revisions
to the master work plan for the upcoming year. This process
also provides the basis for projecting requirements of the
following year (budget year). LMM-3, upon completion of the
master work schedule, will send it (or the pertinent portion
of it) to the appropriate maintenance activities-- the DMA,
commercial, or other armed services' depot maintenance
activities. This provides these activities an estimated
level of output which allows them to plan their workload and
gives them a basis for their budget requirements. [Ref. 14]
In the case of the DMA, a conference is held at HQMC
with personnel from LMM-3, the ICP, and the DMA attending.
At this conference, the workload for the DMA is finalized on
the bases of projected requirements, the manhour avail-
ability of the DMA and the funds available to support the
program [Ref. 2]. Additionally, the master work schedule
will be used by the DMA as a tool to compile it's industrial
fund budget. The DMA will subsequently price out the work
and send the data back to LMM-3 for incorporation into the
0&M,MC and 0&M,MCR appropriations.
However, since the DMA repairs equipment for the supply
stores system stock and because the equipment in the supply
stores system stock has no record which identifies it to
either active Fleet or Reserve forces, the master work
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schedule is a line-by-line schedule of equipment repair for
the entire Marine Corps with no distinction between Reserve
and Fleet generated requirements. The result is that LMM-3
receives back from the DMA a priced out master work schedule
reflecting total Marine Corps figures. At this point the
data reflect realistic cost projections for the total Marine
Corps maintenance requirements in terms of direct labor,
materials, and overhead for incorporation into the budget.
However, LMM-3 must again separate Reserve costs from active
FMF costs in order to comply with the appropriation struc-
tures. This is done by the same methodology used in the
programming process of dividing depot maintenance between
Active and Reserve forces. The Reserves are given a portion
of this total amount corresponding to their last year's
share, adjusted for inflation, while the Active forces
0&M,MC appropriation gets the rest. The quantities used in
justifying these dollar amounts will correspond directly to
the separate quantities identified to be incorporated into
the Marine Corps POM during the programming phase.
The result of this process is two separate figures for
depot maintenance that will be included as part of the
0&M,MC and 0&M,MCR appropriation budget submissions. One
figure will be for the active FMF forces to be incorporated
in the 0&M,MC appropriation (budget activity VII, central
supply and maintenance- -program package, equipment mainte-
nance). The other figure is for Reserve forces to be incor-
porated into budget activity 2, depot maintenance of the
0&M,MCR appropriation. Additionally, LMM-3 keeps a program
summary for both appropriations which provides a record of
how these figures are broken down by program element (PEI,




During the operating phase of the depot maintenance
management cycle, principal end items of equipment and
secondary repairables are received into the supply system
from active and Reserve units. The units, concurrently,
receive serviceable equipment out of the stores system. The
equipment they turn in goes into the stores system as unser-
viceable (unserviceable meaning any condition code other
than code A--ready for issue). The ICP monitors and manages
this activity and pays close attention to the equipment
received at the material division of the MCLB , the levels of
unserviceable equipment accumulating in the stores system,
and the execution of the master work schedule. The master
work schedule will identify, for the ICP, the type and quan-
tity of equipment scheduled to be inducted into the DMA.
The ICP will review this schedule quarterly and, by close
liaison with the material division of the MCLB and the DMA,
will attempt to ensure that the assets are available to be
inducted to the DMA and that the DMA is ready to accept
them. There is often disparity between what was scheduled
to be available for induction to the DMA and the actual
availability of unserviceable assets.
Prior to the material division releasing equipment
for induction to the DMA, the ICP will identify whether the
equipment is a PEI or an SDR and/or whether modification
kits will be applied to the equipment. In the case of PEI *
s
and/or modification kits, the ICP will forward a request to
LMM-3 which has the legal authority to obligate the funds
necessary to perform the work for these program elements.
LMM-3 will originate the funding document (project order),
citing the specific O&M appropriation information against
which to charge work and will cite this against a specific
line item number corresponding to the master work schedule.
The actual dollar amount funded by LMM-3 will be a function
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of the type and quantity of equipment related to the
respective line item. In the case of an SDR, the ICP will
originate the project order themselves and it will be trans-
acted in the same manner as LMM-3's project order as
described above. [Ref. 4]
The project order is under the control of the compt-
roller division of the MCLB for administration and billing
of the order. However, the DMA is responsible for receiving
and accepting the project order and for accomplishing the
work requirements within the scope of the funding document.
The equipment will then be returned to the supply stores
system as serviceable equipment ready for issue. [Ref. 2]
2 . Measuring
Upon receipt of the project order, the DMA will
establish a corresponding job order number (JON) for the
accomplishment of the work authorized. Labor standards are
then reviewed and shop orders are issued for the accomplish-
ment of the work authorized. The shop order's cost and
production are monitored continuously throughout the life of
the project order to assure that execution of the job is
accomplished within the funding and production commitments
established by the project order. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, the DMA's automated data collection system
is capable of identifying all aspects of labor distribution,
material control, cost control and manpower performance
analysis to an appropriate JON [Ref. 2].
The key to the DMA's system of matching costs to
project orders is the assignment of one JON per one project
order corresponding to one line item on the master work
schedule (each line item corresponding to specific program
elements). The DMA, in this way, is able to identify by
program element what type and amounts of resources are being
expended (direct labor, materials, overhead), what functions
were performed in the process (assembly, fabrication,
machining, painting), and what types of equipment the
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resources were being expended for (ordnance, motor
transport, communications).
3 . Reporting
The DMA's automated data collection system identi-
fies all aspects of labor distribution, material control,
cost control, and manpower performance as inputs into a
central computer's maintenance management subsystem. This
subsystem, in turn, generates outputs in the form of reports
for five major areas: 1) inventory control, 2) personnel
control, 3) payroll, 4) cost management, and 5) performance
measurement. The reports are used by the DMA as internal
means to analyze and evaluate their overall organizational
efficiency, as well as the efficiency of each cost work
center within each production control center. The DMA will
also generate reports to satisfy the industrial fund
payroll. The report of primary interest to LMM-3 and the
ICP is the production progress report which exhibits
performance in terms of outputs of serviceable equipment.
The production progress report is prepared quarterly
and states actual quantities of depot maintenance accom-
plished and quantities currently in process by equipment
type. This report provides the responsible managers at the
ICP and LMM-3 with information that they can use to compare
the DMA's planned workload (as projected in the master work
schedule) with the DMA's actual work accomplished or in
process. This allows the responsible managers to stay
abreast of current depot maintenance workloads and better
manage changes to or problems with the master work schedule.
For instance, operating units scheduled to turn in specified
equipment for the R&E program do not always turn in the
equipment. Also, a significant change in the "threat" may
change national strategies and cause a change in rebuild and
repair priorities. Subsequently, the supply stores system
may end up short of equipment that was scheduled to be
processed through the DMA. By being abreast of these
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situations, the responsible officers at the DMA and LMM-3
can incorporate timely changes in the master work schedule
by altering the scheduled production run size to accommodate
the available assets or by altering the order in which
equipment was scheduled to be inducted into the DMA.
At the end of the fourth quarter, the production
progress reports are reviewed, priced out, and totaled.
This dollar total is then reconciled to the dollar total of
the accumulated project orders. This is done by program
element so that the totals can be reconciled separately with
the correct managers. The production progress report is
priced out by use of the same cost factors used in computing
the funding amounts of the project orders. That is, the
cost factor associated with a specific line item number
multiplied by the quantity to be inducted (or that has been
repaired) is equal to the amount of funding (or reconcilia-
tion price). In this way, the reconciliation is between the
actual and planned type and quantity of equipment repaired.
Additionally, at the end of the fourth quarter, the produc-
tion progress report will help identify the amount of carry-
over work from one fiscal year to the next. By managing the
amount of carry-over the DMA will have, the responsible
managers can ensure that, when there is a lag between the
end of the fiscal year and the approval of a new budget
(hence authorization to obligate funds in accordance with a
new master work schedule), the DMA will not suffer the
consequences of having to shut down production and carry
large inventories and unabsorbed overhead.
There are two other reports not mentioned previously
that impact on management of depot maintenance. They are
generated by the Fleet and Reserve forces.
The equipment status report and controlled items
file are periodic reports generated by active and Reserve
forces which are used to establish the priority for funding
maintenance. The ICP analyzes these reports under the
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assumption that this "snapshot" of the status of Marine
Corps equipment is representative of any given period of
time. This representation of the priority in which equip-
ment needs to be repaired is passed on to be incorporated
into the DLMP. The DLMP, as described earlier in Chapter
II, is an annual evolution and serves to update the master
work plan which is, in turn, periodically reviewed and is
reformatted into the master work schedule. The cycle of
interaction among these reports is continuous. [Ref. 4]
E. ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS
The periodic equipment status reports and controlled
items files prepared by operational units (both Reserve and
active) reflect a high state of equipment readiness. This
is evidence that Reserve equipment is being maintained (in
terms of depot maintenance) satisfactorily on the same basis
as active FMF units' equipment. This also suggests that the
Marine Corps depot maintenance efforts are, in total,
successful- -that the process of planning, programming, budg-
eting, and execution of depot maintenance is effective for
not only the active FMF but also the Reserves. However,
this process when compared with the principles of a good
management process described in Chapter II, is not an artic-
ulated process with regards tio the way the Marine Corps
Reserve and the active FMF depot maintenance are separated.
There are aspects of the methodology for separating Reserve
budget figures from active FMF budget figures that prevent
the identification of costs to perform depot maintenance
specifically with the Reserve forces. The result is that a
degree of arbitrariness is introduced into the process of
determining the Reserves' "fair share" of depot maintenance.
The planning phase of the process is consistent with
good principles in that national strategies identify needs
which are analyzed in terms of priorities and resources.
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This allows for further analysis in terms of the ability to
make current resources available to meet the national
strategies and in terms of potential acquisition require-
ments for equipment.
This process remains consistent with good principles as
planning and programming efforts blend together. The infor-
mation being forwarded to LMM-3 (primarily from the ICP) is
the result of the translation of the needs of operational
units and the supply stores system to fulfill the national
strategies. The information is translated into functional
groupings consistent with the ways in which the resources
will be used. That is, repair programs like the R&E program
will identify PEI and SDR requirements which will indicate
priorities of repair for these items, as well as, whether or
not the projected demand for servicing these items meets the
availability of assets. This provides the basis for
projection of new acquisitions and/or the modification
program element. These programs are not only aggregated by
PEI, SDR, and Mod in conformity to the basic program struc-
ture, but they are also time phased in terms of projected
outputs of assets to be fed back into the system and ulti-
mately to the operational units. At this point of the
process, good management principles would require the infor-
mation to be compiled into the program structure and costed
out into the future years to present a statement, in finan-
cial terms, of the Marine Corps' capability to meet it's
plans and goals. However, this is the point at which the
current methodology breaks down and introduces the arbitrary
process which will follow the program throughout the
remaining budgeting and execution phases.
When LMM-3 performs it's additional analysis to adjust
the Reserve data to fit a historically budgeted pattern, it,
in effect, disconnects whatever projections have been made
from the programmed and budgeted dollars that will subseq-
uently appear throughout the process. This "smoothing" of
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Reserve data to "fit" the past pattern is brought on largely
by dealings with the supply system during the execution
phase. As described earlier, the supply system is not
managed to distinguish Reserve equipment separately from
active FMF equipment. It is this aspect of the supply system
that prevents program managers at the ICP and LMM-3 from
determining what portion of the equipment to be repaired at
the DMA will be attributable to the Reserves. To require
the supply system to distinguish Reserve related equipment
would require extra inputs in terms of labor time needed to
collect and process this information, yet would yield no
extra benefit in terms of output--the type and quantity of
equipment processed through the DMA so as to be ready to
support national strategies. Therefore, this breakdown in
programming is (in a greater perspective) due to the nature
of the supply system.
The remainder of the programming, budgeting, and execu-
tion processes is forced to follow this same pattern of
treating the Reserve depot maintenance efforts as being
encompassed within the total Marine Corps and only separates
the two on an arbitrary basis in order to conform to
Congressional requirements to have separate accounts.
Consequently, the master work plan and master work schedule
are total Marine Corps working documents (forecasted and
adjusted quarterly) identifying total types and quantities
of equipment scheduled to be submitted to the DMA for
rebuild, repair, and/or modification. The schedules are
completely void of any Reserve specific requirements.
Additionally, the Reserve budget breaks down depot mainte-
nance by program element (PEI,SDR, and Mod). However,
because the dollar amount is derived incrementally and inde-
pendent from actual projections
,
there is no way to corre-
late the costs to perform depot maintenance to any one of
the program elements. Instead, project orders are cut for
Reserves based on whether the dollar amount fits the
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budgeted capability and whether or not the equipment being
inducted to the DMA is "Reserve type" equipment, regardless
of whether there is all, part, or no equipment being
repaired that is actually attributable to Reserve usage. In
this way, program managers can be very flexible in how they
fund depot maintenance. This flexibility is necessary
because the levels of activity for Reserve depot maintenance
can not only fluctuate significantly from year to year but
also are subject to changes during the operations of the
current year. Flexibility allows program managers to cope
with these fluctuations and ensure a total force depot main-
tenance effort.
The result is that project orders sent to the DMA iden-
tify total types and quantities of equipment , and the DMA
is, therefore, compelled (by it's automated data collection
system) to aggregate and charge costs against one appropria-
tion account per batch of equipment. Therefore, the bill-
ings that come back through the system cannot be justified
as to whether the money funded for Reserve depot maintenance
is being spent for that purpose. What functions were being
performed when the work was being charged to the appropria-
tion and what kinds of resources were being used in the
performance of the work charged to the Reserve appropriation
can be determined. However, there is no way to determine if
this represents actual costs to support the Reserves.
Therefore, even though the current process of planning,
programming, budgeting and executing depot maintenance is
(in terms of total force efforts) justifiable and flexible,
it falls short of being a process which can accurately
articulate Reserve depot maintenance funds with resources
and functions. With regard to the Congressional mandate to
manage separate O&M appropriations specific to Reserves, the
present system is not in compliance with good management
principles, as described in Chapter II of this thesis.
Consequently, even though there may be no benefit, in terms
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of total force readiness, from changing the current process
of programming, budgeting, and executing depot maintenance,
there is a potentially larger benefit to be gained in terms
of credibility, which could have a significant impact on
many Reserve programs in the future.
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IV. TWO ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT DEPOT MAINTENANCE
PROCESS
It has been determined that the problem with regard to
identifying Reserve depot maintenance costs is not in iden-
tifying and aggregating costs at the DMA. The DMA is
capable of identifying all aspects of costs with specific
equipment repair jobs. Costs at the DMA are collected at
the lowest levels, cost work centers (CWC); aggregated for
every CWC in the repair, rebuild, and/or modification
process; and totalled (including the appropriate allocation
of overhead) for each job processed through the DMA. The
problem, then, with regard to identifying costs to support
Reserve depot maintenance is in accurately identifying what
equipment is to be attributable to Reserves either before it
is inducted into the DMA, so that the DMA can aggregate
costs associated with work performed specifically for the
Reserves, or after the maintenance cycle at the DMA when the
equipment is issued to Reserve units. This identification
must be such that the DMA has the basis for a separate JON
for Reserve equipment , even though it may be inducted as
part of a larger, more economically efficient batch.
This chapter will propose two alternatives to the
current depot maintenance process. The first would estab-
lish a process whereby the supply system would separately
identify Reserve equipment as it is received into the supply
stores system from Reserve operating units. A record of
it's origin will be maintained and used as a basis for
determining what portion of the work performed at the DMA is
attributable to Reserves. In this way, what is budgeted for
and charged to the Reserve appropriation would reflect
actual usage in terms of Reserve generated repair require-
ments in the supply stores system.
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The second alternative would establish a process whereby
the supply system need not distinguish between active and
Reserve equipment in stores. Instead, the process would
measure annual Reserve activity on the basis of actual
issues from the supply stores system to Reserve operational
units. These data would reflect the type and quantity of
both PEI ' s and SDR's as Reserve related outputs of the depot
maintenance process. These data would provide the basis for
programming depot maintenance for the Reserves by program
element, based on actual usage. Alternative two would also
allow for the billing of work performed on an equitable
percentage basis. These data would be used to determine
what percentage of the total depot maintenance effort of the
Marine Corps is attributable to the Reserves. Both alterna-
tives would require changes to the present depot maintenance
process and would entail certain common tasks
.
A. COMMON IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE METHODS
The first task common to the two proposed alternatives
is to establish a method whereby the equipment can be iden-
tified by LMM-3 to the DMA as separate line items on the
master work schedule and thus be assigned separate JON's by
the DMA. This can be accomplished by scheduling the work-
loads for Reserve and active Fleet forces equipment on sepa-
rate lines of the master work plan and master work schedule.
In the case of the first alternative, the Reserve line would
be based on the Reserve equipment received into the supply
stores system. In the case of the second alternative, the
Reserve line would be based on a percent of the total for
that equipment type.
Either method will require the additional processing of
separate project orders (the second task common to the two
alternatives) citing separate O&M appropriations against
which to charge the work performed at the DMA. This would
result in increased administrative time, materials, and
services. The costs associated with the additional
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processing would be variable in nature- -being directly
related to the level of depot maintenance repair activity
specifically attributable to the Reserves. This activity
has been forecasted for the 1987 and 1988 POM's and is
illustrated in table IV .
TABLE IV
NUMBER OF LINE ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT PROJECTED
TO BE INDUCTED INTO THE DMA
Reserve Total Reserve % of Total
PEI 1987 17 364 4.7?,
1988 15 304 4.9%
SDR 1987 61 1700 3 . 67o
1988 67 1800 3.7%
Note: One line item of equipment could range from
a quantity of 1 to a quantity of 3500 depending on
the type of equipment, it's priority of repair and
it's availability.
Based on the level of activity projected in table IV and
interviews with the Industrial Fund Manager and Budget
Analyst from LMM-3, the amount of extra administrative time
involved in accomplishing the first task of separating
active FMF and Reserve workload requirements on the master
work plan and master work schedule is insignificant. It is
well within the present capabilities of the salaried work-
force and is, therefore, not a relevant cost. Additionally,
the cost of supplies, materials, and services to accomplish
this task is not relevant because these costs will be
incurred during the normal process of reviewing, adjusting
and reconciling the master work plan and master work
schedule regardless of whether separate line numbers are
created for the Reserves workload. Therefore, there is no
extra cost incurred to distinguish between the Reserve work-
load and the active FMF workload on the master work plan or
the master work schedule. There is, however, a benefit from
this in that the process would now provide the basis for the
DMA to assign separate JON ' s to the work. Thus it could
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aggregate all aspects of costs associated with the work
performed for the appropriate source (active or Reserve).
The second task, handling extra project orders, is a
direct result of developing separate line items on the
master work plan and master work schedule and is consistent
with the DMA's accounting procedures. Certain aspects of
generating extra project orders will not involve relevant
costs for the same reasons stated in the previous section.
However, other aspects of the increased handling of project
orders are relevant and will show up as increased costs of
materials and services corresponding to the extra level of
activity generated by Reserve requirements. These costs,
although variable with regard to the level of Reserve
related activity, will have a fixed nature in that they will
be accumulated to the same degree whether the quantity for a
particular line item number (hence project order) is one or
whether the quantity is 3500. Because of this, the cost to
process a project order could be relatively high when
compared to the cost to perform the work when a very low
quantity of equipment requiring a very small amount of
funding is processed. This is very feasible in view of the
amounts of Reserve activity reflected in Table IV . LMM-
3
estimates that the cost per project order is $50, as
described below.
A project order will be handled by eight
different personnel during the course of the mainte-
nance process and will require each person approxi-
mately 15 minutes to process it. This equates to
120 minutes or two manhours to process one project
order.
The average annual salary of the personnel
involved in processing the project order is $27,000
and the standard number of hours worked per year is
2088. This results in an average labor rate of $13
per hour. This labor rate times the two manhours
required to process the project order yields a total
labor cost of $26 per project order.
A non-labor cost associated with processing a
project order derives from charges for message and
wire service, as well as costs of miscellaneous
supplies (paper, ink, etc.). The aggregated non-
labor cost is estimated to be, approximacely
,
$24
per project order and when added to the total labor
cost per project order of $26 yields a total cost
per project order of $50. [Ref. 15]
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However, the derivation of $50 per project order does
not take into account that much of the labor involved is
performed by a salaried labor force, that the additional
workload caused by more project orders can be processed
without the need to increase the existing labor force, and
that, as a result, this is no relevant cost. Therefore, a
more realistic cost per project order can be derived by
subtracting the $26 labor cost from the $50 total cost to
process one project order to yield a total relevant cost to
process one project order of $24.
The end result of the cost impacts common to the two
proposed alternatives is that, while there is no significant
cost to separate Reserve and active FMF projected workloads
on the master work plan and master work schedule, there is a
relevant cost of $24 per project order for material and
services = This cost, which occurs as a result of the
Reserve specific depot maintenance activity, would show up
as increased operational costs within various offices of the
ICP; the Comptroller at MCLB , Albany; LMM-3; and Fiscal
Division, HQMC . At the level of activity projected in Table
IV for 1988, this cost would equate to about $1,968 annually
as shown in Table V .
TABLE V
TOTAL ANNUAL COST OF INCREASED WORKLOAD
SDR 67 '-' $24 =-- $1,608
PEI 15 ^-' $24 -- $360
$1,968'
B. ALTERNATIVE ONE
The planning phase for this alternative would require no
change to the current process. However, the DLMP would play
a greater role as the key document which states, in terms of
time phased requirements, the Marine Corps' depot
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maintenance plan to meet national objectives and goals.
Information from the DLMP would be used to develop a
program, in financial terms, reflecting the capability to
carry out this plan. This alternative would require LMM-3,
during the programming phase, to use the projections of
Reserve activity provided in the DLMP not only in the POM
submission but also in developing the workloads reflected in
the master work plan and the master work schedule. The
budget would, consequently, flow out of the programming
phase by incorporating the costed-out data that the DMA
provides from the master work schedule into a budget format.
This would make the budget consistent with the way in which
equipment would be identified as a Reserve generated
requirement, scheduled for induction at the DMA, and,
subsequently, billed to the Reserve appropriation. In doing
so, the incremental smoothing and the arbitrariness would be
eliminated from the current process of managing depot main-
tenance. This would make alternative one precise in terms
of accounting practices, as well as credible in terms of
justifying to the Fiscal Division at HQMC and ultimately to
Congress that what is budgeted for Reserve depot maintenance
would be actually spent in that regard. However, there
would also be a potential disadvantage to this alternative.
The funding amounts for Reserve depot maintenance would
reflect what requirements should materialize during the
fiscal year based on the DLMP. Programmed requirements are
independent from what is actually turned in from operational
units. Actual turn- ins are a function of the realities that
units often defer turning in equipment that is serviceable
and, conversely, units will need to turn in equipment that
is unserviceable whether it is programmed to be turned in or
not [Ref. 4]. For example, a very common situation would be
where the Reserves were scheduled to turn in "x" amount of
PEI ' s and SDR's for depot repair during the course of the
fiscal year, but they actually turned in an amount, "x+y"
.
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The "y" amount of Reserve generated depot maintenance
requirements would not be funded in the depot maintenance
portion of the 0&M,MCR appropriation^ Consequently, a
transfer of funds from the O&MjMC appropriation to the
0&M,MCR appropriation would have to be approved or else the
extra "y" amount of requirements would go unfunded and be
carried over to the next fiscal year's workload. The oppo-
site situation could also occur, where less equipment would
be turned in than was programmed and the extra dollars in
the depot maintenance portion of the 0&M,MCR appropriation
would need to be used in support of the FMF depot mainte-
nance efforts. In either case, the inflexibility of this
alternative to cope with variances between planned and
actual activity and the consequent need to transfer funds
between O&M appropriations could lead Congress to interpret
such transfers as a reflection of improper budgeting prac-
tices. This situation would be aggravated when viewed in
concert with the irregular year-to-year funding patterns
that would be characteristic of this alternative.
The basic feature of this alternative is to identify the
equipment that is received into the supply system as to
whether it is a Reserve generated requirement to repair.
This involves identifying (as to quantity and type) the
equipment in the supply stores system as to whether it was
received from the Reserve or Active forces. This informa-
tion would need to be recorded and managed to provide a
justifiable basis for scheduling and billing the work
performed on this equipment by the DMA. To establish this
identification process requires no changes to the supply
system's information system. The necessary information
needed to identify and monitor Reserve generated equipment
is already being recorded. The change to the current
process of managing depot maintenance would require the
inventory managers at the ICP to call-up the document
control file portion of the master information file or, for
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serialized items (i.e., small arms and radios), the
controlled items file. These files contain information
reflecting the status of the equipment in the supply stores
system. This information is controlled by the use of docu-
ment numbers for each type of equipment, and part of the
make-up of this document number is a unit identification
code (UIC) or a reporting unit code (RUC). These codes link
a piece of equipment to the originator of the document- -an
operational unit. In this way Reserve equipment can be
identified and monitored until it is inducted into the DMA
for depot maintenance. In doing this, separate project
orders can be provided to the DMA (from LMM-3 for PEI ' s and
from the ICP for SDR's) on the basis of actual Reserve
generated requirements. For example, if ten unserviceable
trucks within the supply stores system were scheduled to be
sent to the DMA for repair and three of them were received
from Reserve units, then the total batch of ten trucks would
be inducted into the DMA on two separate project orders- -one
for seven trucks citing the 0&M,MC appropriation and one for
three trucks citing the 0&M,MCR appropriation. As stated
earlier, it is expected that the numbers of actual Reserve
requirements that materialize out of the supply stores
system would not always match the number planned for on the
DLMP and master work schedule. This disparity would be
reconciled quarterly and the schedules would be adjusted as
is done presently for total Marine Corps requirements. This
process of comparing actual activity to planned activity and
adjusting the outyears to accommodate the differences lays
the framework for future programming and budgeting. In this
way, programs and budgets can be projected by program
element and reconciled to actual levels of activity attribu-
table to Reserve and active FMF units.
The costs inherent in this alternative (in addition to
the $24 cost common to both alternatives for handling
additional project orders) are in terms of extra inputs of
55
labor required to distinguish Reserve equipment from active
FMF equipment. Since there are no system change costs asso-
ciated with this alternative, managing the available data is
the key factor. Interviews with the program manager at the
ICP, MCLB , Albany determined that the person responsible for
managing the data would be a GS-11. It would take that
person 15 minutes twice a month to call-up the necessary
files and screen, record, and format information as to the
type and quantity of equipment received at the material
division at the MCLB from Reserve units. Once the informa-
tion is recorded and formatted, it would be compiled and
passed to the schedulers at the ICP. This part of the
process falls within the scope of normal current operations
in the management of total Marine Corps assets and, as a
result, would be done regardless of whether Reserve and
Active forces were processed as separate requirements.
However, the time required by the schedulers at the ICP to
record, validate and list as a requirement by scheduling
Reserve specific equipment would be a function of the amount
of Reserve equipment involved. Table IV indicates that the
general activity for PEI ' s and SDR's combined would be about
seven per month. Again, interviews with the program manager
at the ICP, MCLB, Albany determined that it would take a
scheduler approximately five minutes per request to handle
this extra workload or about 35 minutes per month
The total amount of extra time required for salaried
personnel to accomplish this alternative is 65 minutes over
the course of a month (30 minutes for recording and moni-
toring by the inventory managers and 35 minutes for the
schedulers) Again, as in the case of the development of
separate line items on the master work schedule and master
work plan, there is enough excess capacity in the present
salaried workforce to handle the amount of time needed to
accomplish these Reserve related tasks. Therefore, labor is
not a relevant cost and the total cost to incorporate and
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accomplish this alternative is the cost common to both
alternatives of $24 per project order for handling extra
Reserve specific funding documents.
C. ALTERNATIVE TWO
The second alternative of identifying the destination of
equipment as it comes out of the supply stores system
instead of recording and tracking Reserve equipment coming
into the supply stores system would allow the depot mainte-
nance process to be managed in accordance with the "one
Marine Corps" concept for which the supply system is
designed. Reserve equipment would not have to be tracked
through the supply stores system as separate depot mainte-
nance requirements.
The preparation of the DLMP would again be central to
the planning phase at the TCP, in that it is the DLMP that
translates national strategies and objectives into quantita-
tive rebuild, repair, and/or modification requirements from
which data would be developed for inclusion in the POM. In
this alternative, however, the DLMP needs only to focus on
total Marine Corps requirements- -from which total program
figures would be developed. Concurrent with the development
of the DLMP at the end of the fiscal year, the Comptroller's
records would need to be reviewed in order to determine the
type and quantity of SDR's and PEI ' s that were issued to the
Reserves during that fiscal year. These data would be used
to build a historical file from which trends could be
analyzed by program element for expected future levels of
activity. Simple averaging , exponential smoothing, and
linear regresssion are possible methods of accomplishing
this task. These two documents together (the DLMP and the
historical data file) would provide the basic information
for LMM-3 to develop the POM submission. The programming
process for this alternative would be performed by compiling
the projected quantities and types of equipment for Reserve
depot maintenance by PEI and SDR, time phasing them for the
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outyears , and costing them out- -much in the same way as it
is done now.
The difference between the current process and alterna-
tive two is that currently the workload figures derived at
this point in the process are "smoothed" to fit dollar
amounts corresponding to a predetermined level of funding.
The difference, then, between what was projected for Reserve
depot maintenance and the predetermined dollar amount is
merely added to or deducted from the amount otherwise
programmed for the depot maintenance portion of the 0&M,MC
appropriation. This aspect of the current process is what
leads to it's failure to justify what was programmed, budg-
eted, and executed for Reserve depot maintenance and thus,
prevents reconciling what is spent for Marine Corps Reserve
depot maintenance to any measure of Reserve activity. The
figures derived in accordance with alternative two would not
cause the same failure at this point. Although the figures
would still be "smoothed", they would then be derived from
actual activity (outputs received by Reserves) and could be
supported by the historical file. These figures would
represent the Reserves ' actual share of depot maintenance as
a yearly average, which would be programmed for the POM year
and the outyears
.
In developing the master work plan and master work
schedule, it would only be necessary to program the total
Marine Corps requirements. However, the schedule's format
would be designed such that line numbers would be able to be
identified for the Reserves. A percentage of the total of
any given line item could be funded by the Reserve appropri-
ation. The budgeting phase for this alternative would be an
extension of the programming efforts, in that the budget
would project, by program element (PEI,SDR, or Mod), the
same level of activity for the Reserves as stated in the
POM. Just like the current process, the dollar figure would
then be derived from the current DMA prices, derived from
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the priced out master work schedule that the DMA prepares
for LMM-3. However, when the budget is formatted, this
alternative would require LMM-3 to determine what percentage
the Reserve depot maintenance figure is of the total Marine
Corps depot maintenance figure. By doing this, when a batch
of equipment is scheduled to go to the DMA for repair, two
project orders could be originated from the corresponding
line number of the master work schedule (for example, line
number 1 and IR) and funded in accordance with the
percentage share between the active FMF 0&M,MC appropriation
and the Reserve 0&M,MCR appropriation. This would allow for
the same degree of flexibility as is currently used to
ensure that all depot maintenance is funded regardless of
variations in actual and planned requirements.
Additionally, by funding work performed at the DMA on a
percentage basis, this alternative allows the DMA to aggre-
gate cost by program element and charge them to the appro-
priate appropriation. This links what is being charged to
the Reserve appropriation to a measure of actual activity,
as evidenced by a historical file identifying outputs the
Reserves have received as a result of the depot maintenance
cycle. Although not as precise as alternative one in terms
of justifiable levels of activity, alternative two would
provide evidence which justifies that what would be budgeted
for depot maintenance of Reserve equipment would be spent
for that purpose. This matching of budgeted and actual
spending might not occur precisely in each fiscal year, but
it would do so over a period of many years.
Again, interviews with the program manager at MCLB
,
Albany indicated that the labor cost to perform this alter-
native (like alternative one) would not be a relevant cost.
The interview determined that it would take a GS-11 only 12
hours annually to gather the data necessary to build a
historical file. Additionally, the time spent in the
analysis of this data for programming and budgeting purposes
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would be no greater for this alternative than in the current
process. This is because this type of analysis is an
on-going part of the management of the total Marine Corps
depot maintenance effort, anyway. Therefore, since there is
no additional relevant cost of changing to alternative two
in terms of time spent in the analysis of the data, the
result would be just like alternative one. The only rele-
vant cost of alternative two is the cost of $24 per project
order to handle the Reserve specific funding documents.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the final analysis, the practicality of identifying
Marine Corps Reserve depot maintenance costs rests on deter-
mining to what extent the costs of doing so are worth the
benefits gained. The incremental costs (cf. Table V) are
clearly modest, if not negligible. The benefits to be
gained are in terms of two separate and equally difficult to
quantify conditions- -force equipment readiness and credi-
bility. Under the current methodology of managing Reserve
depot maintenance, the Reserves are reportedly "healthy"
with regard to the state of equipment readiness and are
being supported in terms of depot maintenance in accordance
with national priorities. This research has found no reason
to believe that either alternative one or alternative two
would prove to be any more beneficial in this regard,
because neither proposed alternative would improve the effi-
ciency of the system in terms of serviceable equipment
available to be issued to operational units or strategic
mobility enhancement programs. Therefore, no change can be
justified on grounds of improved force equipment readiness.
However, there are benefits to be gained by changing to
either alternative one or alternative two in terms of the
ability to relate the work programmed for rebuild, repair,
and/or modification of Reserve equipment to actual levels of
activity. Additionally, either alternative would provide
the ability to reconcile what has been budgeted for depot
maintenance for the Reserves with what has been spent to
accomplish the work. These benefits cannot be measured in
terms of dollars or readiness but, instead, represent credi-
bility which can be gained (or not lost). In managing the
depot maintenance for the Marine Corps (as in managing any
appropriation account), it is vital that the program
managers provide information that is worthy of belief by the
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higher authorities who have control over allocating funds
for programs (Congress) and by those who are responsible for
recording these transactions (Fiscal Division, HQMC).
Therefore, in a cost-benefit analysis of changing from the
current process of managing depot maintenance to alternative
one or alternative two, credibility becomes the essential
benefit
.
Credibility is not a short run phenomenon. It is a
characteristic built with time and has long term conse-
quences. Thus, in addition to influencing future levels of
Reserve funding (including not only depot maintenance but
also all aspects of FDYP program 5), the value placed on
credibility, regardless of the size or nature of a program,
is a statement about the Marine Corps organizational values.
The current process of managing depot maintenance is
characterized by being flexible with regard to funding work
performed at the DMA. However, it is based on an arbitrary
budgeting process which has no link to any measure of actual
Reserve activity. It is not a justifiable process and has
been the source of many unanswered questions by the Fiscal
Division, HQMC relative to whether the money spent for
Reserve depot maintenance was really used in that regard.
The current process lacks credibility. Both alternatives
one and two would provide the credibility needed to execute
a justifiable depot maintenance process of planning,
programming and budgeting. The cost associated with
adopting alternative one or alternative two has been deter-
mined in the previous chapter to be variable in nature at
$24 per project order. Based on a level of activity as
typified by Table V, the annual cost to change from the
current process to either alternative would be approximately
$1,968. This amount, when contrasted to the amounts budg-
eted for depot maintenance in Tables II and III from Chapter
II of this thesis, is hardly significant. The cost of
$1,968 annually is worth having a system of planning,
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programming, budgeting, and execution for Reserve depot
maintenance that is articulated, reconcilable, and, in
general, credible. Therefore, the identification of Reserve
depot maintenance costs is not merely feasible but also
necessary. What remains to be established, then, is which
alternative (one or two) is most beneficial in terms of it's
impacts on the overall management of the depot maintenance
process
.
Alternative one, although more precise in terms of
accounting practices than alternative two, is less flexible
in terms of managing variations between planned and actual
requirements. This makes the programming process more
difficult and makes the execution phase subject to transfer-
ring funds in order to adjust to fluctuating levels of depot
maintenance or subject to carrying over Reserve depot main-
tenance requirements from one fiscal year to the next
because of the lack of funds in the depot maintenance
portion of the 0&M,MCR appropriation. This type of shuf-
fling of funds could cause Congress to interpret it as a
reflection of improper budgeting practices. This would
subject budget submission to closer Congressional scrutiny
and possible cuts in the Marine Corps Reserve budget in an
effort by Congress to stabilize the fluctuating budget
figure.
Alternative two's measure of the level of activity does
not fluctuate from year to year for budget purposes because
it would be a trend prediction based on averaging, exponen-
tial smoothing, or regression, which would produce a more
stable budget figure year after year. By funding each line
number of the master work schedule in accordance with the
Reserve's percentage of the total Marine Corps depot mainte-
nance effort, alternative two not only ensures that all
depot maintenance would be accomplished and funded on a
actual "fair share" basis without the need to transfer
dollars between appropriations but would also provide the
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flexibility necessary to manage an account the size of the
Reserve depot maintenance account, which cannot handle large
fluctuations between planned and actual requirements on an
annual basis. Additionally, alternative two provides a
justifiable degree of precision by relating what is budgeted
and spent to an actual historical measure of Reserve
activity.
The cost to change from the current process of managing
the Reserve depot maintenance funds to either alternative
one or two would entail the same basic cost of $24 per
project order, or about $1,968 for a typical year. The
final tradeoff between the two alternatives, then, is
between the precision gained in terms of program and budget
justification versus the flexibility of the process to be
executable in such a way that variations to the schedule
will not jeopardize the overall Marine Corps maintenance
effort. The depot maintenance process is subject to the
realities of the changing needs of the operational units
and, as such, will always be characterized by variances
between planned activity and actual activity. Because of
these operational realities, there is no additional benefit
to being more precise in identifying and projecting actual
Marine Corps Reserve requirements for depot maintenance.
However, there is a need for the method of managing the
depot maintenance process to be justifiable in the sense
that it can be related to an actual measure of Reserve
activity. Alternative two provides this. Moreover, alter-
native two provides the flexibility needed to ensure that
Marine Corps Reserve equipment will be maintained regardless
of fluctuating levels of activity. Therefore, it is
submitted that a change to the current process of managing
depot maintenance for the Reserve forces would provide a net
benefit to the Marine Corps. It is, additionally, recom-
mended that the method to effect a change should be the
process described in alternative two.
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